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Case Spotlight: Settipalli v. Settipalli

By Matthew J. Price

In recent years, the Publication Committee of the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin has been the focus of intense criticism concerning its decision-making process relative to the publication of family law cases that are either resolved upon the application of well-settled, controlling precedent to a pedestrian set of facts, or a modification of existing law premised upon an impossibly- convoluted, fact-limited set of circumstances not likely to reemerge in our lifetime.¹ Those charges aside, periodically, the court of appeals issues an opinion recommended for publication (a virtually certainly it will be published) that employs the services of what would ordinarily be a run-of-the-mill per curium opinion applying straightforward law as a vehicle for communicating a message, oftentimes powerful, to the public and/or the bar. Some of these "message" opinions require varying levels of reading-between-the-lines to elicit the theme. Others, such as this issue’s spotlight case addressing sanctions against appellate counsel, Settipalli v. Settipalli, No. 03-3287 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2004), bear no such cloaking.

Ramakrishna and Sandesha Settipalli married by arranged marriage in 1995 and have resided in Wisconsin since. Ramakrishna was raised in India and Sandesha in the United States. The couple had no children. They lived together sporadically during the marriage, permanently separating in 2001, before Ramakrishna filed for divorce in 2002.

In India, Ramakrishna graduated from medical school in 1989, completed his internship in 1991 and entered a residency program in 1993. Ramakrishna left the residency program a few months after he started in order to study for the United States medical licensing exams, to enable him to practice in this country. Ramakrishna began taking the U.S. medical exams in 1996 and over several years was unable to pass all of the necessary exams. As a result, at the time of trial, Ramakrishna, who had been previously terminated from his residency position here because his inability to pass the licensing exams, was unemployed and not licensed to practice medicine.

Sandesha, a college graduate who briefly attended medical school, presented evidence that she suffers from certain mental health issues that prevented her employment during parts of the marriage, including at the time of trial.

The parties accumulated very little marital property, though Sandesha claims that financial contributions to Ramakrishna’s career made by her (from her employment income) and her family (at least part of which was in the form of a dowry paid to Ramakrishna’s family) entitled her to a greater share of the marital estate and increased or continued maintenance.

The parties stipulated to the award of certain marital property and the trial court awarded Sandesha the balance of the marital estate, which totaled approximately $10,000. The trial court also awarded Sandesha lump-sum maintenance of $15,000, payable over thirty months with interest.

Sandesha appealed the property division, which was rejected by the court of appeals in a unanimous opinion authored by the newest member of District I, Judge Joan F. Kessler, who noted that Sandesha received 100% of the disputed marital property, which results in "at least an equal division [of the total marital estate] and may be tilted in her favor." The court commented that "her appeal of this result is curious."

Sandesha also appealed the trial court’s denial of her requests for both a percentage of Ramakrishna’s unknown future income as maintenance and a hold open of maintenance pending his future employment. Relying on the supreme court’s implicit disfavor of percentage maintenance orders except under very unusual circumstances warranting a non-fixed sum, as enunciated in Poindexter v. Poindexter, 142 Wis. 2d 517, 419 N.W.2d 223 (1988), the court of appeals concluded that no such circumstances exist which support a percentage maintenance award. Moreover, the court of appeals concluded that the facts relative to each party did not warrant an increased maintenance award: both parties earned about the same total income during the marriage, both parties were unemployed, the wife was contemplating medical or graduate school, the husband had his medical degree but had not passed all licensure exams, the wife was being treated for mental health problems and the husband was fired from his residency program for failure to pass the licensure exams. Also, the court of appeals rejected Sandesha’s claims that she sacrificed in furtherance of Ramakrishna’s education. The court found that Ramakrishna earned his medical degree in 1989, brought no medical school debts into the marriage, was unsuccessful in passing the licensure exams, his earning capacity was not enhanced during the marriage and his future earnings were speculative.

As indicated previously, the court of appeals’ affirmance of the trial court constituted an elemental erroneous exercise of discretion analysis as performed in hundreds of unpublished cases annually. Unless Sandesha was your client or a close friend or family member, the court of appeals property division and maintenance holdings probably do not evoke any, let alone strong emotions. (One rhetorically wonders whether a "Wow!" factor should be a condition precedent to publishing a family law case, other than those of first impression. However, I will leave that rumination to Gregg Herman for his next offensive against the Publication Committee.) Instead, it is most likely the appellate court’s stinging rebuke against Sandesha’s attorney for his conduct on appeal, and the attendant warning shot fired at perceived overzealous practitioners, that renders Settipalli "publish- worthy."

The court of appeals concluded that Sandesha’s attorney intentionally misrepresented facts in briefs filed with that court. In the first example, the court of appeals reports that Sandesha’s brief repeatedly asserts that she "should be given at least the opportunity that [Ramakrishna] was given to obtain his medical license in the United States and complete his residence." However, Sandesha did go to medical school, but dropped out due to medical reasons. The court of appeals appears to agree with Ramakrishna’s complaint that Sandesha improperly implies that she dropped her medical training because of or on behalf of Ramakrishna. The second example, characterized by the court of appeals as a lack of candor, involves Sandesha’s attorney interpreting a statement made by the trial court during an objection colloquy with Ramakrishna’s attorney as a factual finding that Sandesha did not go to medical school as a sacrifice to Ramakrishna. In fact, the trial court’s statement was merely the trial court’s prediction as to the subject matter of what Sandesha’s counsel was likely to attempt to establish during Sandesha’s testimony:

THE COURT: I assume, and again I shouldn’t assume, but I assume he is following these questions to establish that number one, she anticipates to go to medical school as to what her future is going to be for the next few years, and or two, she had always wanted to go to medical school and didn't as a sacrifice to the petitioner....

The court of appeals found that, "Sandesha’s attorney’s representation to the contrary in the brief is false and misleading. It suggests a conscious attempt to mislead this court." Given a subsequent opportunity in response to a motion for sanctions, Sandesha’s attorney not only failed to fall on the sword, but pressed on to the dismay of the panel: "The response contends that the court’s statement ‘supports the Court’s own acknowledgment and appreciation for [Sandesha’s ] plight.’ The trial court made no such findings and Sandesha’s repeated insistence that it did so is highly inappropriate."

Following its condemnation over these misrepresentations, the court of appeals blasted Sandesha’s attorney for his failure to provide citation to either the trial court record or legal authority for a litany of factual and legal assertions set forth in Sandesha’s brief.

With regard to sanctions, the court of appeals declined to strike Sandesha’s brief and dismiss the appeal, finding such a remedy too drastic. Instead, the court of appeals invoked WIS. STAT. § (RULE) 809.83(2), which permits sanctioning a party for noncompliance with court rules. The court cautioned:

Vigorous advocacy for a client, and candor with the court, are not inconsistent requirements of our legal system. Both characteristics are expected and honored by the court and by the public. These expectations are of such long standing in, and of such importance to, our judicial system that departure from either one of those requirements is a serious matter.

The court of appeals concluded that because candor with the courts and compliance with court rules was primarily the responsibility of the attorney, the court assessed Ramakrishna’s appellate attorney fees and costs against Sandesha’s attorney and remanded the matter back to the trial court for its computation.

While I am not apt to gravitate toward "grassy-knoll" theories, the cynic in me doubts very much the coincidental nature of this sanction bomb being dropped into a family law case. Before ascending to the bench, Judge Kessler concentrated a substantial portion of her practice to family law. Moreover, as legal specialists tend to focus on cases within their arena, the impact of this wake- up call to family lawyers may have been muted if couched within a general civil or criminal appeal. And all of this is good. Family lawyers practice under what are arguably the loosest, least enforced set of procedural pleading and practice rules in any litigation forum. Of course, much of this fluidity benefits practitioners and their clients positively by allowing flexibility in achieving settlement in the face of very complex life circumstances. However, this fluidity can and is frequently abused - more often toward the slacker end of the pendulum than the overzealous end found in Settipalli. While the conduct as framed by the court of appeals in Settipalli does not even approach a close call, one should be careful to discount that this case signals that family lawyers are being watched a bit closer and the standards have been - appropriately - raised.

Matthew J. Price, senior associate at Loeb & Herman, S.C., Milwaukee, primarily concentrates his practice in the area of trial and appellate family law.

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Footnotes

¹ - See Gregg Herman, "To publish or not to publish - That is the question," (Wisconsin Law Journal Nov. 17, 2004) and Gregg Herman, "Pub Committee needs guidance on family law cases," (Wisconsin Law Journal Apr. 3, 2002). Back to Top

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