Imagine calling
to the witness stand the paramour of your client's estranged spouse,
in an attempt to prove that the spouse entered into a marital property
agreement with a divorce in mind. It sounds like it's just Hollywood
fodder. But it could happen, as a result of a recent decision from
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in which the court held that any marital
agreement entered into following the commencement of a divorce action
must be approved by a court to be valid.
The unanimous
decision specifically failed to decide the more difficult situation:
where the agreement is reached after the marriage but before a divorce
action is filed. Moreover, the case does not even address whether
the presumptions of validity under Wisconsin law are entirely reversed,
in terms of equity and practicality.
In Van Boxtel
v. Van Boxtel, 2001 WI 40, the parties signed an agreement regarding
certain parcels of real estate during the pendency of a divorce. Prior
to submitting the agreement to the court for approval, the husband
repudiated the agreement.
The supreme court,
citing a court of appeals case, Evenson v. Evenson, 228 Wis.
2d 676, 598 N.W.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1999) as "controlling precedent,"
upheld the court of appeals decision allowing Mr. Van Boxtel to do
so. The court held that agreements reached in contemplation of divorce
must be treated under Wis. Stat. § 767.10(1), which requires the approval
of the court, as opposed to agreements reached in contemplation of
continuation of the marriage, which are binding on the court under
Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(L).
The decision
appears to establish a bright line between prenuptial agreements,
where the parties are clearly contemplating marriage, and agreements
signed during the pendency of a divorce. However, the court shed no
light on the more difficult cases: those where the parties are already
married, but not divorce action has been filed. In Ayres v. Ayres,
230 Wis. 2d 431, 602 N.W.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1999), the court of appeals
held that such an agreement was made in contemplation of divorce and
therefore invalid if not approved by the court. However, the high
court in Van Boxtel specifically refused to signal how it might rule
on such a situation.
As a result,
there remains a large gray area for those situations - which are not
uncommon - where an agreement is signed after a marriage, but before
a divorce has been filed. In cases like in Ayers, where a divorce
is filed within a few days, the conclusion that a divorce was contemplated
might not be difficult. In other cases, however, the validity of the
agreement may very well require state-of-mind evidence, for example,
whether one party really was intending the marriage to continue or
was engaging in divorce estate planning. Extrinsic evidence, such
as the previously mentioned secret romantic partner, might be admissible
as evidence of motive or state of mind.
In any event,
one might question whether a law that binds parties to prenuptial
agreements, while permitting them to repudiate agreements made in
contemplation of a divorce should be reversed. Prior to marriage,
the emotional circumstances of the parties are not conducive to focusing
on the financial ramifications of an eventual divorce. Further, as
the parties are about to say "until death do we part," those financial
circumstances are very much unknown as a divorce may occur shortly
or many years in the future.
On the other
hand, when a divorce is contemplated, the parties are far more likely
to be focusing on the financial consequences of their decisions. Also,
the timing of the divorce is much closer, giving the parties a much
clearer picture of their financial circumstances. Yet, Wisconsin law
presumes the former agreements valid and latter are vitiated. In addition
to leaving a wide gap of uncertainty, Wisconsin law may have transposed
the two circumstances for which it has given direction.
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