
Paternity
and Arithmetic
By Gregg Herman
As
published in the December 11, 2002 edition of the Wisconsin Law Journal
A recent District II Court
of Appeals case, recommended for publication, addressed the difficult issue of
biological versus psychological parentage. In an interesting decision involving
what the court of appeals called "an unusual factual situation scenario",
the court upheld the result reached by the trial court, but for entirely different
reasons. This is the first of two articles discussing the implications of the
decision. In Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J.,, No. 02-0469 (Nov. 13, 2002), Norma gave
birth to a daughter while married to Randy. Genetic tests, not ordered by the
court, proved that Brendan was really the biological father.
For the first year and one-half of his life, Norma visited Brendan with the child
weekly. Then Norma began a period of incarceration and the child lived with Randy.
While Norma was incarcerated, Randy started a divorce action, seeking to exclude
contact between Brendan and the child. Norma filed a counterclaim, seeking Brendan
to be named the child's father. Brendan filed a motion to intervene, seeking not
only to be named the father, but also seeking legal custody and primary physical
placement, as well.
Waukesha County Circuit Court Judge Lee S. Dreyfus found that Norma was equitably
estopped from raising the issue of paternity. After a hearing, the court went
on to find that, pursuant to Wis. Stats. §767.463 and 767.458(1m), it was
in the child's best interests to dismiss Brendan's motion to intervene and Norma's
counterclaim as well.
The District II court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order, but on different
grounds. In a decision by Judge Richard S. Brown, the appellate court held that
both Wis. Stats. §767.463 and 767.458(1m) were inapplicable, as they were
both premised on no genetic tests having been performed. In the instant case,
the biology of the child was already known as genetic tests had been performed
without court order.
Notwithstanding the errors by the trial court in methodology, the appellate court
agreed with the result. The court held that Wisconsin has an "equitable parent"
doctrine. According to the appellate court, the equitable parent doctrine "extends
the rights and responsibilities of a natural parent to a nonbiological parent
seeking custody of visitation."
Citing a Michigan court
of appeals decision, the Wisconsin court of appeals found that, under the equitable
parent doctrine, a husband who is not the biological father of a child born during
a marriage can be deemed the natural parent of the child where:
the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father
and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such
a relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for
divorce
The husband desires
to have the rights afforded to a parent; and
The husband is willing
to take on the responsibility of paying child support.
The Wisconsin court went
on to find that Randy had served in the role as father and that there was a father-child
bond created, whereas Bendan had not performed the appropriate roles. Accordingly,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that it was in the
child's best interests that Norma be estopped from asserting the child's parentage.
The appellate court affirmed that Randy is the legal father and entitled to custody.
A Punctuation Problem?
The court of appeals might have reached the same conclusion, but more firmly rooted
in statutes, had it read Wis. Stat. §767.463 without a comma.
In relevant part, the statute allows a trial court to "...refuse to order
genetic tests, if genetic tests have not been taken, and dismiss the action..."
The court of appeals appears to include the phrase between the commas with the
preceding clause. Under that reading, the court can dismiss an action only if
the court has not ordered genetic testing. Had the appellate court read the statute
with the middle portion conditioning the preceding clause, the court would still
have the power to dismiss the action even if genetic testing had already been
done.
The underlying problem appears to be with two statutes which appear - at least
according to the reading by the court of appeals - to assume that the paternity
tests occur only when ordered by the court. Perhaps they hearken back to an older
time, when ABO blood tests could only exclude potential fathers, not determine
parentage. Today, however, with DNA testing, parentage can be definitely established.
At least from a biological point of view.
In reality, being a parent means much more than donating DNA. And it means more
than an occasional purchase of diapers, formula or clothing when the mother visits,
as the trial court in this case noted. Being a parent means bonding with a child,
having a relationship with a child, simply being there for a child.
The law, of course, recognizes that these "psychological" bonds can
be far more important than biological ones. Therefore, the law allows the court
to terminate parental rights under certain circumstances. The law allows children
to be adopted, and once finalized, the parent-child legal bond is identical to
parent-child bonds created biologically.
When Simple Arithmetic
Becomes Complicated
The underlying issue is one of simple arithmetic. The law allows each child to
have one father, not zero (usually) or two fathers. If there are two candidates,
the issue is frequently resolved by which one wants to volunteer. If the volunteer
is the husband, the marital presumption controls and the case is over. If the
volunteer is the boyfriend (for want of another term) and the husband wants out,
the presumption can be overturned and the boyfriend adjudicated the father through
a paternity procedure.
The difficult legal battles - the ones commanding the wisdom of Solomon - arise
where there are two volunteers - both willing to pay support, if need be, and
both wanting a relationship with the child. Simple arithmetic requires the court
to subtract one candidate, who most likely will then be completely eliminated
from the child's life.
Whether this is best accomplished with use of the existing statutes or the appellate
court fashioning its own equitable remedy will be the subject of the second article
discussing this case.
Back
to Herman Article Archive