
Status Quo Statute Bumps
Heads
With Statute Pushing Joint Custody
By Gregg Herman
As it appeared
in the July 21, 2004 edition of the Wisconsin Law Journal
What
happens when new legislation causes a direct conflict with an existing
statute? Did the Wisconsin legislature forget about the existing law?
How does an appellate court, which is supposed to interpret statutes,
not rewrite them, deal with such a conflict?
Such a conflict
was the subject of a decision in early last month from the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals in In
re the Paternity of Nicholas B.P., Nos. 02-3390 and 03-1267 which
was recommended for publication.
In February, 1992,
Leanne M.A. and Bradley J.P. entered into a stipulated paternity judgment
which awarded Leanne sole custody (and presumably primary physical placement)
of Nicholas, born Oct. 6,1991, with Bradley having periods of physical
placement "as agreed between the parties."
In August, 2001,
Bradley filed a modification motion requesting joint custody and shared
physical placement of Nicholas. The social worker, as well as the GAL,
recommended joint custody and increased placement to Bradley. Nonetheless
in December 2002, Portage County Circuit Court Judge John V. Finn denied
Bradley's motion, concluding that Bradley failed to establish a substantial
change in circumstances since the entry of the previous order per Wis.
Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)1.b and that Bradley failed to rebut the presumption
in favor of maintaining the status quo in custody and placement matters
per sec. § 767.325(1)(b)2.
Bradley moved for reconsideration, alleging that the rebuttable presumption
in favor of the status quo violated his constitutional right to equal
protection. Finn denied the motion for reconsideration, indicating that
it was not unfair to presume to maintain the status quo in the eleven
years since the entry of previous order. Further, Finn noted Bradley
should not be permitted to raise his constitutional argument six months
after the hearing on his original motion. Bradley appealed from both
the December 2002 order denying his modification motion and the February
2003 order denying reconsideration.
The District IV
majority opinion, authored by Judge Higginbotham, held that the trial
court erred in concluding that there was not a substantial change in
circumstances, as the trial court focused on the years immediately preceding
the hearing. Instead, the court of appeals concluded, that "when
the entire relevant time period is considered, the facts clearly show
a substantial change in circumstances." Nevertheless, the court
of appeals concluded that the trial court's error was harmless, as the
trial court did proceeded to an analysis of best interest considerations
to determine whether Bradley rebutted the status quo presumptions in
§ 767.325(1)(b)2.
Bradley argued
that the trial court erred in applying the custody status quo presumption,
rather than the joint legal custody presumption set forth in §
767.24(2)(am). Bradley supports his position by pointing out that §
767.325(5m), which provides that custody and placement modification
proceedings be made "in a matter consistent with s. 767.24,"
obligated the trial court to presume that joint legal custody is in
Nicholas' best interest, per § 767.24(2)(am). This result would,
in effect, establish a presumption of joint legal custody in all cases,
pre or post judgment.
The majority disagreed.
It held:
"[T]he most
reasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 767.24(2)(am) is that
the presumption that joint legal custody is in the child's best interest
applies only in initial legal custody determinations, not in modification
determinations. Were we to conclude that the § 767.24(2)(am)
presumption favoring joint legal custody applied to a Wis. Stat. §
767.325(1)(b) motion for modification of custody and physical placement,
such a conclusion would, in essence, eliminate the § 767.325(1)(b)
presumption favoring the status quo."
Judge Lundsten
filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the holdings of the majority,
but concluding that the statutes at issue are unambiguous, which resolves
itself in the same fashion as the majority's analysis.
Meanwhile, Presiding
Judge David G. Deininger Deininger dissented, opining that the trial
court erred in giving no consideration to the joint legal custody provisions
of §767.24(2)(am) or the maximizing placement with each parent
factor contained in §767.24(4)(a)2. The dissent suggests that the
trial court felt overly-constrained by the status quo presumption and,
had it not been so constrained, it may have reached a different result.
Interestingly, the dissent concludes that both presumptions (status
quo and joint custody) should be weighed and considered by the trial
court in rendering its decision.
While the court
took care not to criticize the legislature, a more skeptical eye would
question whether the legislature ever thought about the conflict between
the new and the existing statutory provisions. The answer, no doubt,
is in the negative. The legislative analysis by the majority of the
court seemed result-driven. There is indeed a difference between an
initial award of custody and future modifications. By keeping the bar
for modifications relatively high, the court discourages such actions.
Peoples’
lives are constantly changing. As in this case, people move and change
jobs with regularity. By making modification actions easy, any change
could become the basis for legal action.
Sometimes that
might be a good thing. Then again, regularity and consistency in placement
is a good thing, as well. Although the majority had to engage in a theoretical
exercise to find a metaphysical “legislative intent”, the
final result promotes consistency for children. While it would have
been nice had the legislature considered all the statutes it was affecting,
the appellate court completed the legislative process, while camouflaging
its decision as “ascertaining” legislative intent.
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