
Appreciating the Appreciation
of Separate Property
By Gregg Herman
Wisconsin Journal of Family Law, January,
2002
It is well-established that
under Wisconsin law income from excluded, non-marital property, is marital
property. However, the law is not as clear regarding the effect of appreciation
of non-marital property. A recent court of appeals decision does little
to clear up this confusion.
With some degree of certainty,
it is generally acknowledged that appreciation of a non-marital asset
is non-marital if the asset appreciated due to normal market conditions.
For example, in Wierman v. Wierman, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that an increase in value in a wife's business interest resulting from
her father's successful management of the corporation was not marital
property, because neither party actively caused the appreciation in
value.
Far muddier is the task of
assesing the impact on the marital estate of appreciation occurring
due to efforts of either the owning or non-owning spouse. In Schwegler
v. Schwegler, for example, the court of appeals held that the amount
of appreciation due to general economic conditions accrue to the gift.
However, any appreciation due to contributions by the non-owning spouse
is includable in the marital estate. The court did not address the issue
of whether these contributions were to be included, even if the non-owning
spouse had been compensated for the efforts. In Haldemann v. Haldemann,
the court of appeals first introduced the distinction between compensated
and uncompensated (or undercompensated) efforts in considering what
portion of gifted / inherited property should be included in a marital
estate. The court in Haldemann held that § 766.63(2) requires that
"appreciation in value of separate property which results from
the efforts and abilities of the non-owning spouse may be viewed as
part of the marital estate under the doctrine of equitable distribution."
However, the court added the corollary that "the efforts and abilities
of the non-owning spouse must be unusual and uncompensated."
Several years later, in a
probate case, Estate of Kobylski v. Hellstern, the court of appeals
established a three-pronged test for creation of a marital property
interest in excluded property based on the application of industry by
a nonowning spouse. The nonowning spouse's industry creates a marital
property component in individual property if all of the following conditions
are met: (1) the nonowning spouse applied substantial labor or skill
to the property in question, (2) the nonowning spouse received no reasonable
compensation for his efforts, and (3) the efforts produced substantial
appreciation in the value of the property. While marital property classification
may differ under Chapter 767 from Chapter 766, the court had held in
Estate of Lloyd that the issues of sufficient effort and appreciation
are the same in both the divorce and the death context.
Also, in Schorer
v. Schorer, the court held that the increase in the value of a separate
corporation due to marital efforts is part of the marital estate. However,
the court did not use the word "uncompensated" prior to the
phrase "marital efforts". This appears to have been an oversight
by the court of appeals, rather than a change in the law.
Similarly, in Ayres
v. Ayres, relying on Plachta, the court of appeals excluded from the
marital property division, the appreciation of stock value where the
husband was gifted stock in the family's corporation. Ms. Ayres argued
that the increase in stock value was due to the husband's efforts as
an employee of the company. In rejecting her argument, the court said
held that, "the record does not support [wife's] contention that
the appreciated value was attributable to [husband's] efforts as opposed
to other factors
the appreciated value did result from the
general accumulation of efforts of previous generations and general
market conditions. Perhaps because it was unnecessary, the court ignored
the question of whether Mr. Ayres' efforts were compensated.
Most recently,
in, Richmond v. Richmond, the court of appeals reversed the trial court
for including the entire amount of appreciation of a gifted farm in
the martial estate. Although the court of appeals agreed with the legal
standards applied by the trial court concerning appreciation of individual
property, it determined that the trial court erroneously exercised its
discretion in considering only contributions to the marriage in its
entirety, instead of focusing on contributions during the four years
of rapid appreciation in the value of the farm.Once again, the court
failed to consider whether any of the efforts were compensated during
the marriage.
The issue of appreciation
of non-marital property is too common and too important for an appellate
court to treat haphazardly. Appreciation of a non-marital asset due
to uncompensated effort by the non-owning spouse would be a windfall
if awarded to the owning spouse. Similarly, if the marital estate already
benefitted from the appreciation through compensation - regardless of
which spouse received the compensation, would provide a windfall to
the non-owning spouse to include the appreciation once again in marital
estate.
Two potential problems
are apparent with the "no (or inadequate) compensation" rule.
First, it is not always easy to prove what efforts caused the appreciation.
While this is true, it also not always easy to prove whether appreciation
resulted from market conditions or other causes, which is the test if
the court ignores compensation.
Second, it may
not be easy to determine what constitutes "adequate" compensation.
On the other hand, making findings of this nature is why trial courts
exist. While this determination may not be easy, a court exercising
its discretion is performing precisely the role for which it was created
- - avoiding an unfair result to either party.
The assumption is that where
compensation is not an issue, the court of appeals, rather than ducking
their responsibility, simply used a short-hand recitation of the state
of the law. Given the complexity and importance of the issue, it is
submitted that the court should be more careful in the future in summarizing
the law, unless it truly intends on changing it.
Back
to Herman Article Archive